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INTRODUCTION: FROM THE INTERNATIONAL TO THE LOCAL 
For many people across the globe, human rights remain aspirational.  
American politicians and diplomats often speak of the need to improve 
human rights abroad in places such as China, Sudan, and North Korea.1  
 
∗ Assistant Professor, Florida State University College of Law.  Thanks to Steve Gey, Aaron 
Saiger, David Schleicher, and all the participants in the Cooper-Walsh Colloquium.  Jamie 
Koscicek provided excellent research assistance. 
 1. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, SUPPORTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY: THE 
U.S. RECORD 2006 (2006), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/80699.pdf; Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks on the Su-
dan Strategy (Oct. 19, 2009), available at www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/10/ 
130686.htm. 
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Popular political discourse recognizes much less often the need to turn in-
ward and improve our own government’s human rights behavior, be it fed-
eral, state, or local.  Despite the lack of mainstream support, for the last 
several years, NGOs and academics have increasingly criticized the failure 
of domestic actors to successfully bring human rights home.  These criti-
ques have given way to a second stage in the human rights struggle—the 
articulation of justifications, structures, and specific policies for imple-
menting domestic human rights. 
This piece is the fourth of a multi-part series of papers that takes a sup-
portive but also critical approach to the project of bringing international 
law home.  The first piece, Take the Long Way Home: Sub-Federal Inte-
gration of Unratified and Non-Self-Executing Treaty Law,2 documented the 
existence of apathetic and intransigent federal actors and identified the role 
of sub-federal actors such as states and cities in implementing unratified 
and non-self-executing treaty law.  In so doing, that paper acknowledged 
the significant federal limits on such behavior and discussed the limited 
role of sub-federal actors in promoting federal ratification.  It also hypothe-
sized that existing local and regional efforts on the Kyoto Protocol and the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (“CEDAW”) would serve as models for expanded sub-federal be-
havior. 
The second piece, The Non-Legal Role of International Human Rights 
Law in Addressing Immigration,3 contended that even unratified interna-
tional human rights law influences non-binding regional processes, contri-
butes to the development and dissemination of best practices, and helps 
produce and codify a human rights discourse.  I looked outside of formal 
international law structures to identify ways in which human rights can 
move from international law into the state.  This Article investigated re-
gional consultative processes and Italy’s immigration reforms as examples 
of state actors undertaking voluntary compliance with human rights norms 
outside of traditional pathways. 
Most recently, Human Rights Impact Statements: An Immigration Case 
Study4 proposed that domestic government actors, including states and lo-
calities, undertake human rights review of pending legislative and agency 
actions.  I used the highly successful and much copied model of environ-
 
 2. Lesley Wexler, Take the Long Way Home: Sub-Federal Integration of Unratified 
and Non-Self-Executing Treaty Law, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (2006). 
 3. Lesley Wexler, The Non-Legal Role of International Human Rights Law in Address-
ing Immigration, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 359. 
 4. Lesley Wexler, Human Rights Impact Statements: An Immigration Case Study, 22 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 285 (2008). 
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mental impact statements as a starting point, but looked also at instances 
where government actors used such reviews to conduct more qualitative 
analyses.  This Article addressed some design issues raised by such a pro-
posal including: (1) which policies should be subject to assessment; (2) 
which governmental entities should conduct them; and (3) what conse-
quences ought to flow from a human rights assessment or impact statement.  
Though I reached no conclusive recommendations, I noted the possibility 
and benefits of state and local experimentation in working through some of 
these design questions. 
As a part of this larger project, this Article once again focuses on cities 
as a vital pathway for the movement from the international to the local.  
Like the prior works, this Article mixes theories, hypotheses, and case stu-
dies to illuminate the potential for bringing international law home.  While 
the nation-state remains an extremely important player in the formation and 
enforcement of international law, international law also influences behavior 
by moving through sub-federal actors and regional sites.  Sometimes this 
change occurs at the national government’s behest, but oftentimes it also 
occurs when other government actors bypass those nation-states resistant to 
its pull.  This Article seeks to explain why and how cities in particular can 
play an important role in bringing human rights home. 
In the fifth and likely final paper, I anticipate concluding this discussion 
by looking closely at various methods to move human rights into the ad-
ministrative state.  That piece will compare a variety of human rights insti-
tutions that can be integrated at the federal, state, and local levels.  I wish to 
look more deeply at the possibility for human rights impact statements, as 
well as determining the role for human rights commissions and ombuds-
men.  I plan on returning to some of the case studies introduced in earlier 
works, but this time for a sense of their administrative structure and design 
choices. 
In so doing, this final work seeks to complete the cycle with the philo-
sophical justifications for administrating the human rights state.  The works 
in this project share the assumption that while we may all inherently pos-
sess human rights, the contours of those rights are also something articu-
lated in and constituted by both international and domestic law.  Thus, this 
Article will also return to the recurring theme of creating a human rights 
discourse.  I intend to argue that advocates sometimes overlook the boun-
daries of those inherent human rights and elide the justifications needed for 
creating enforceable protection of them.  I will suggest that administrating 
a human rights state can create the sort of reasoned articulation necessary 
to forge a consensus in favor of strong human rights protection.  I wish to 
show how these various human rights institutions themselves can serve as 
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justifying bodies for the content of human rights by serving as vital sites of 
specification. 
Before moving into this final component, however, this current paper 
needs to first explain the role of cities in the overall project.  In recent 
years, international law scholarship has moved beyond a statist conception 
in which only national governments create and then implement internation-
al law.5  Rather, bodies at all levels ranging from the transnational, such as 
regional consultative process and more formal international institutions, to 
state legislatures and state courts, and to local units such as cities, have all 
become active participants in the project of enshrining human rights in law.  
While previous works mostly took as a given federal inactivity in regards 
to human rights treaties, Part I reviews the numerous historical, political, 
and structural reasons for the limited federal efforts to integrate human 
rights treaties at home.  These include the institutional objections of Inter-
national Federalists, the substantive objections of Positive Rights Rejecters, 
and the political discretion concerns of the Flexible Foreign Policy Advo-
cates.  Although a domestic constituency supportive of human rights exists, 
until recently, it has focused mainly on human rights promotion rather than 
internal integration, and, thus, not created a strong counterbalance to the 
various political opponents. 
I then link these political objections to the various structural hurdles 
through which treaties must pass.  Such obstacles include the limited power 
of the executive’s signature, the composition of the Senate, and various Se-
nate procedures for treaty ratification. Though such obstacles are not in-
surmountable, I explain why they are particularly likely to pose challenges 
for human rights treaties. 
Part II begins with a typology of various local human rights initiatives.  
Such categorization can help identify when constitutional, political, and 
 
 5. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of Interna-
tional Law is Domestic (or, The European Way of Law), in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE DI-
VIDE BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 110 (Janne Nijman & André Noll-
kaemper eds., 2007); Sarah Cleveland & Catherine Powell, Foreword to Human Rights in 
the United States: A Special Issue Celebrating the 10th Anniversary of the Human Rights 
Institute at Columbia Law School, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2008); Janet Koven Le-
vit, Bottom-Up International Lawmaking: Reflections on the New Haven School of Interna-
tional Law, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 393 (2007); Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change “Interna-
tional”?  Litigation’s Diagonal Regulatory Role, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 585 (2009); Catherine 
Powell, Foreword to Symposium, International Law and the Constitution: Terms of En-
gagement, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 399 (2008); Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Juris-
diction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619 (2001); Melissa A. Waters, Creeping 
Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward Interpretive Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties, 
107 COLUM. L. REV. 628 (2007); Melissa A. Waters, Normativity in the “New” Schools: 
Assessing the Legitimacy of International Legal Norms Created by Domestic Courts, 32 
YALE J. INT’L L. 455 (2007). 
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economic limitations are most likely to be present.  I then articulate some 
reasons why some cities might be more likely—and more effective—first 
movers.  These include possible political homogeneity, avoidance of cer-
tain federal level objections, enhanced capacity to generate visible benefits 
for their constituents, and structural advantages in passing ordinances.  In 
undertaking those efforts to integrate human rights, cities might create 
some local benefits that exist above and beyond mere substitution for fed-
eral action.  I also wish to identify some of the city-specific gains that may 
arise from local implementation.  Cities can capture good governance gains 
independent of whether the federal government decides to act.  As they  of-
ten provide basic social services and possess a large bureaucracy, subject-
ing city bureaucracies to human rights creates gains for its residents, re-
gardless of what actions states and the federal government decide to 
undertake.  So even in those instances in which the federal government acts 
to bring human rights home, cities can supplement and reinforce those ef-
forts by acting as laboratories and providing an additional layer of protec-
tion by promoting good government. 
This section, however, concludes by identifying some structural limita-
tions on cities that do not exist at the federal level and by cautioning those 
who believe cities to be a likely motivator of federal behavior.6  Many of 
the same factors that allow cities space to act also serve as impediments to 
effective state and federal spillovers.  While cities can perform much sig-
nificant work bringing human rights home, we must simultaneously ac-
knowledge that they also labor under significant structural and political 
constraints in order to have a realistic sense of cities’ true potential in 
bringing human rights home. 
I.  U.S. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AS A RELUCTANT AND INCOMPLETE 
FIRST MOVER 
Given the federal government’s exclusive authority to conduct treaties 
with foreign powers7 and the limitation on sub-federal actors’ abilities to 
conduct agreements and compacts with those same actors, the federal gov-
ernment seems at first blush to be the first best actor in bringing human 
rights home.  Regardless of this statement’s accuracy, it does not necessari-
ly follow that the U.S. federal government will or must be the first mover 
in this arena.  This section details the various reasons why the U.S. federal 
government is often, and perhaps systemically, reluctant to prioritize the 
 
 6. I have discussed in other works why cities cannot capture all of the benefits of treaty 
ratification, so I will not return to that subject here. See, e.g., Wexler, supra note 2, at 32-35. 
 7. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10. 
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ratification and domestic enforcement of international human rights as em-
bodied in treaty law. 
Before describing the reasons for the government’s reluctance, I want to 
draw attention to two rather large, related assumptions of my project.  First, 
this Article presumes that many benefits flow from framing substantive 
policies in the human rights framework.  While this Article looks at many 
human rights treaties and ordinances that might be reimagined instead as 
part of a civil rights agenda, or public health program, or good governance 
initiative, I more fully explore the reasons to prefer a human rights frame-
work in some of the other papers in this series.  In short, I have argued 
elsewhere human rights may provide a better mechanism to mobilize do-
mestic and international support, build domestic and international net-
works, and capture domestic and international media attention.  Of course, 
such a contention is an empirical question that needs to be empirically 
tested.8  Yet this paper addresses a different part of the puzzle by explain-
ing why some cities may be particularly likely to pass human rights ordin-
ances, what those projects look like, and what legal and political constraints 
may prevent the spillover of such efforts. 
Second, I presume that the human rights framework should be tied to in-
ternational law.  Once again, the underlying justifications for these assump-
tions are developed in prior works.  I only briefly revisit those articulations 
here.  I contend that international law 
produc[es] a fully articulated framework by which to understand the prob-
lem underlying the [law]; reduc[es] drafting costs for welfare-maximizing 
legislation; provid[es] focal points that cities and states can use to meas-
ure compliance; offer[s] evidence of an international consensus on the ex-
istence of, and approach to, a problem; and present[s] an instrument to 
express and signal a cosmopolitan self identity.9 
Of course, for those who resist the call of cosmopolitanism, many of these 
benefits seem to be costs instead, particularly when preexisting domestic 
law can serve some of the other functions I identify. 
A. Objecting to the Federal Integration of Domestic Human Rights 
Since the passage of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(“UDHR”), the United States has developed an uneasy relationship with the 
international human rights project.  Neither Democratic nor Republican 
 
 8. See Clifford Bob, Bringing Rights Home?  The Promises and Pitfalls of Rights 
Strategies in Social Justice Advocacy (May 7, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=989048 (follow “One-Click Download” hyperlink)). 
 9. Wexler, supra note 2, at 13. 
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presidents have embraced the full panoply of strategies to recognize and 
implement human rights domestically.  The U.S. government has long re-
sisted signing and ratifying many major human rights treaties such as the 
CEDAW and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”).10  Even 
ratification of major human rights treaties leads to few federal legislative 
changes or initiatives.11  Unlike its European counterparts,12 the U.S. feder-
al government has created no national human rights institution, utilizes no 
human rights ombudspersons, lacks a human rights commission, and fails 
to conduct human rights impact statements on proposed initiatives.  Yet, at 
various times over the last sixty years, the United States proudly carried the 
mantle of a human rights leader.  American diplomats aggressively drafted 
and promoted various human rights treaties including the UDHR,13 the 
CRC,14 and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination.15  American presidents on both sides of the aisle 
have cited human rights as justifications for supporting particular foreign 
leaders, limiting military and economic aid for various regimes, and even 
using military force.16  Although America’s relationship with international 
human rights law is a long and complicated one, this section identifies sev-
eral political positions that help explain why, despite varying and often 
high levels of national support for human rights, the federal government is 
generally unlikely to be a first mover on domestic integration of interna-
tional human rights.17 
The first set of arguments I identify as belonging to “International Fede-
ralists,” who vigorously oppose human rights treaties as (1) imposing on 
domestic sovereignty by subordinating the federal government to interna-
 
 10. US: Treaty Signing Signals Policy Shift, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, July 24, 2009, 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/07/24/us-treaty-signing-signals-policy-shift (noting that 
“The United States has signed six of the nine core international human rights treaties, but 
ratified only three.”). 
 11. Kenneth Roth, The Charade of US Ratification of International Human Rights Trea-
ties, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 347 (2000). 
 12. See generally Gauthier de Beco, National Human Rights Institutions in Europe, 7 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 331 (2007). 
 13. See NATALIE HEVENER KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE SENATE: A 
HISTORY OF OPPOSITION 73-78 (1990). 
 14. See SHARON DETRICK, A COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON 
THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 650-56 (1999) (describing the drafting of the CRC). 
 15. See NATAN LERNER, THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF 
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 29-82 (1970) (identifying U.S. involvement in the drafting of the 
Convention). 
 16. See, e.g., Shirin Ebadi, Keynote Address: Islam, Human Rights, and Iran (Oct. 17, 
2008), in 23 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 13, 16-21 (2009). 
 17. For a more detailed explanation of why the U.S. is unlikely to join treaties, see Wex-
ler, supra note 2, at 38-41. 
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tional decision-makers and/or (2) infringing on states’ rights by allowing 
the federal government to use treaties as an end run around states’ authori-
ty.18  While various groups oppose the specific content of particular human 
rights agreements, many of these opponents care, or at least claim to care, 
more about the distribution of power and authority than the content of the 
human rights rules themselves.  In fact, many of these opponents often 
couple their federal and state sovereignty arguments with the observation 
that the United States is already largely voluntarily compliant with interna-
tional human rights and consequently has no need for additional protections 
or oversight.19 
The International Federalists’ high water mark culminated in the pro-
posed 1952 Bricker Amendment.  This amendment sought to limit the 
reach of international treaties by dictating that “[a] treaty shall become ef-
fective as internal law . . . only through legislation by Congress which it 
could enact under its delegated powers in the absence of such a treaty.”20  
While this proposed constitutional amendment failed, International Fede-
ralists forced President Eisenhower to commit to not adhere to future hu-
man rights treaties to pacify amendment supporters.21  Although senatorial 
support for this viewpoint has waxed and waned over time, adherents of 
this view have thus far succeeded in blocking ratification of the CEDAW 
and CRC.22 
 
 18. John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of 
Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218, 2237-39 (1999).  President Carter urged the 
adoption of a reservation recognizing state sovereignty. Transmittal Letter, 14 WEEKLY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 395 (Feb. 23, 1978) (referring to Letter of Submittal, Dep’t of State, Dec. 
17, 1977); Letter from Warren Christopher, Deputy Sec’y of State, to President James Cart-
er (Dec. 17, 1977), reprinted in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATES: WITH 
OR WITHOUT RESERVATIONS? 88, 96 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1981).  The International Co-
venant on Civil and Political Rights has in fact been ratified subject to an understanding of 
the same import.  Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Report on the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, S. Exec. Rep. No. 102-23, at 9 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 
645, 652; see also Aya Gruber, Who’s Afraid of Geneva Law?, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1017, 
1075-84 (2007) (debating the federalist argument that international treaties should “be pre-
sumptively non-self-executing in order to preserve state rights”); Barbara Stark, Economic 
Rights in the United States and International Human Rights Law: Toward an “Entirely New 
Strategy”, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 79, 82, 91 (1992) (noting that the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has not been ratified because of concerns of its impact 
on state sovereignty). 
 19. See Jack Goldsmith, International Human Rights Law & the United States Double 
Standard, 1 GREEN BAG 365, 371-72 (1998). 
 20. KAUFMAN, supra note 13, at 30-31. 
 21. Louis B. Sohn, United States Attitudes Toward Ratification of Human Rights In-
struments, 20 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 255, 260 (1990). 
 22. See SRINI SITARAMAN, STATE PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL TREATY REGIMES 
197-204 (2009); John Fonte, ‘The World is My Constituency’: Are Liberals Rejecting the 
Liberal-Internationalist Tradition?, NAT’L REV., Nov. 17, 2008, at 44. 
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One might suggest the International Federalists are in fact merely using 
structural arguments as a cover to mask their more substantive objections.23  
For instance, many of those who most strongly favored the Bricker 
Amendment feared that other countries would force the United States to 
change segregationist behavior which they believed to be legitimate as a 
matter of principle.  They would likely have resisted domestic change 
enacted through structurally legitimate channels as strongly as they did 
calls from international actors.24  Regardless of the ultimate source of their 
opposition, it is worth identifying this as a distinct influence on the political 
behavior of federal actors.  Even if some of the time these arguments are 
mere smoke screens, they can still constrain executive and legislative beha-
vior. 
The second camp which I term “Positive Rights Rejecters,”—
sometimes, though not always, aligned with the first—resists much of the 
content of international human rights law.  While often presented as a mo-
nolithic structure, foundational international law documents contain at least 
five basic categories of human rights.  These include: (1) rights of the per-
son such as life, liberty, and security of the person; (2) rights associated 
with the rule of law; (3) political rights such as freedom of expression, as-
sembly, and association; (4) economic and social rights which refer to an 
adequate standard of living; and (5) rights of communities.25  Many coun-
tries find the wide variety of such rights uncontroversial and enshrine them 
in their constitutions.26  The U.S. Constitution, however, creates very few, 
if any, obligations on the government to provide social services or commu-
nity rights.27  Similarly, the U.S. Legislature has not seen fit to recognize 
 
 23. Thanks to Steve Gey for this observation. See also Catherine Powell, CEDAW, Fe-
deralism, and Democracy in U.S. International Lawmaking, OPINIO JURIS, Mar. 21, 2008, 
http://opiniojuris.org/2008/03/21/cedaw-federalism-and-democracy-in-us-international-
lawmaking/ (suggesting opponents use federalism arguments in lieu of their actual substan-
tive objections). 
 24. See David Golove, Human Rights Treaties and the U.S. Constitution, 52 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 579, 585 (2002) (observing that those lodging anti-treaty federalism arguments “prin-
cipally had racial segregation in mind”); Judith Resnick, Law’s Migration: American Excep-
tionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 
1578 (2006) (“[A] specific premise of the American constitutional agreement to ‘split the 
atom of power’ was that it enabled slavery to survive, if not flourish.  States claimed a sove-
reign prerogative to determine which persons were recognized as legally entitled to the 
sanctity of their own bodies and the fruits of their own labors.”). 
 25. Charles R. Beitz, Human Rights as a Common Concern, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 269, 
271 (2001). 
 26. Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic 
Guarantees?, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 90, 91 (Michael Ignatieff 
ed., 2005). 
 27. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982). 
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many of these categories of rights, as it sees them as unjustified extensions 
of the government’s role, unduly costly, or as correlative with socialist 
forces.28 
Positive Rights Rejecters argue for substantive minimalism, suggesting 
that human rights concerns should be limited to forcible intrusions on bodi-
ly security29 or, slightly more broadly, other limitations on the govern-
ment’s relationship with the individual.30  They shy away from the creation 
of positive obligations for the federal government.  Such individuals might 
raise the philosophical objection that governments only exist to protect 
negative liberty.31  Similarly, they contend social and economic rights do 
not actually exist because they believe rights, properly defined, must cor-
respond to obligations.32  Since they find international law lacks meaning-
ful definitions of the content of governments’ obligations associated with 
such rights, they view economic and social claims as mere aspirations or 
preferences. 
Positive Rights Rejecters also voice more pragmatic objections.  Even if 
the state might be permitted to undertake an expansive role in enforcing a 
maximalist view of human rights, it ought not do so because, in practice, 
implementing a broader set of rights usurps the limited resources available 
to monitor and enforce the more narrow set of “negative” human rights.33  
They contend that in a time of limited fiscal resources, international human 
rights treaties fail to respect the delicate resource balancing that must oc-
cur.  Similarly, assuming that the state may properly engage in positive 
rights enforcing, using international law to broadly define human rights 
may use legal language to mask mere political judgments at the expense of 
meaningful political deliberation.34 
Such a view need not lead to a universal rejection of international human 
rights law.  For instance, Positive Rights Rejecters may embrace those trea-
ties that restrict the state’s power, such as the Convention Against Torture 
 
 28. Sunstein, supra note 26, at 92 (identifying various explanations). 
 29. Joshua Cohen, Minimalism About Human Rights: The Most We Can Hope For?, 12 
J. POL. PHIL. 190, 192 (2004).  Cohen rejects this view. Id. at 191. 
 30. Such a view is consistent with the Supreme Court’s reluctance to recognize welfare 
rights such as financial assistance, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970); hous-
ing, Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972); education, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 
(1982); and health care, see Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, State Constitutionalism and the Right 
to Health Care 3-21 (Aug. 12, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1421504 (follow “One-Click Download” hyperlink)). 
 31. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 198, 210-213 (1980); Maurice 
Cranston, Are There Any Human Rights?, 112 DAEDALUS 1 (2003). 
 32. See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (1919). 
 33. Cohen, supra note 29, at 193. 
 34. Id. 
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and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).  
Yet, the United States has long resisted those human rights treaties that 
promise social and economic rights such as the International Convention on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Convention on the Protection 
of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families.35  
Even when the United States signs and ratifies international human rights 
law, Positive Rights Rejecters have been wary of the creation of any specif-
ic judicially enforceable rights stemming from those treaties.36 
A third group, “Flexible Foreign Policy Advocates” object not to the 
domestic effects of human rights treaties or the role of the government in 
securing those rights, but rather to the possible limitations that supporting 
international human rights places on our ability to conduct foreign policy.  
While adherents to this group might like, or at least be neutral on, the inhe-
rent benefits of human rights at home, they suggest that the United States’ 
support for particular human rights treaties might complicate diplomacy, 
requiring delicate political maneuvering.37  Such concerns might motivate 
people on either side of the political aisle; the decision of whether to en-
gage or contain human rights violators is not a purely partisan one. 
Despite the combined forces of such arguments and political supporters, 
countervailing positions also influence the political process.  For instance, 
the group of individuals I identify as “Foreign Human Rights Promoters” 
strongly supports the United States’ adherence to multilateral efforts to 
strengthen human rights.  Foreign Human Rights Promoters can count as 
their success such actions as the United States’ membership in, and active 
support for, the UDHR as a mechanism to export constitutional values 
abroad.38  In addition, the United States belongs to four of the major U.N. 
human rights treaties, including the ICCPR, the Convention Against All 
 
 35. Benjamin Mason Meier & Larisa M. Mori, The Highest Attainable Standard: Ad-
vancing a Collective Human Right to Public Health, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 101, 128 
n.112 (2005); Amnesty International, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Questions and 
Answers, http://www.amnestyusa.org/escr/files/escr_qa.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2010). 
 36. See generally Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concern-
ing “Self-Executing” and “Non-Self-Executing” Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 515 
(1991). 
 37. See Theodor Meron, The Time Has Come for the United States to Ratify Geneva 
Protocol I, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 678 (1994) (discussing similar concerns in the context of an 
international humanitarian law treaty). 
 38. See PHILIPPE SANDS, LAWLESS WORLD: AMERICA AND THE MAKING AND BREAKING 
OF GLOBAL RULES FROM FDR’S ATLANTIC CHARTER TO GEORGE W. BUSH’S LAWLESS WAR 
(2005). 
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Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against Torture,39 and the 
Genocide Convention.40  The U.S. also strongly supported the United Na-
tions World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993.41  More re-
cently, President Obama signed the International Disability Treaty and is 
asking for Senate ratification.42  He also identified the CEDAW as one of 
the top three U.N. treaties he would like to see ratified during his term and 
has created an ambassador for women’s rights in the State Department.43 
Yet even the Foreign Human Rights Promoters have often viewed inter-
national human rights law as a way to extol the exceptionalism of America.  
They seem to believe that we already know and understand how govern-
ments should treat their citizens and we need only find effective mechan-
isms for transporting those approaches.44  Foreign Human Rights Promo-
ters have little interest in changing domestic law to conform to international 
law or in creating judicially enforceable rights that would stem from these 
treaties. 
Given these various constituencies, it should be no surprise that internal 
critique and change of domestic human rights progress has been less than 
forthcoming.  Domestic support for human rights has generally been di-
rected as a way to improve external, rather than internal, conditions.45  As 
discussed in more detail below, both the U.S. government and domestic 
NGOs produced extensive information on global compliance with human 
rights treaties.46  Such information may have spurred externally-oriented 
human rights legislation, such as the government’s practice of linking eco-
 
 39. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, at 20, 1465 
U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987). 
 40. Other important memberships include the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967); International La-
bour Organization, Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, adopted June 25, 1957, ILO 
No. 105, 320 U.N.T.S. 291; Slavery, Servitude, Forced Labour and Similar Institutions and 
Practices Convention of 1926, Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, 60 L.N.T.S. 253. 
 41. ROBERT F. DRINAN, THE MOBILIZATION OF SHAME: A WORLD VIEW OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS 16 (2001). 
 42. Nancy Langer, UN Disabilities Treaty Deserves Support, BALT. SUN, Aug. 2, 2009, 
at 23A. 
 43. Megan Carpentier, A New State of Mind, MS., Spring 2009, at 42. 
 44. Golove, supra note 24, at 579; see also Book Note, Are American Human Rights 
Groups Exceptional in Their Silence?, 119 HARV. L. REV. 631, 636 & n.20 (2005). 
 45. RICHARD A. FALK, HUMAN RIGHTS HORIZONS: THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE IN A GLOBA-
LIZING WORLD 38-39 (2000). 
 46. Kenneth Cmiel, The Emergence of Human Rights Politics in the United States, 86 J. 
AM. HIST. 1231, 1241 (1999) (quoting the Washington Post’s observation that human rights 
legislation “would probably not have passed except for ‘the large volume of detailed infor-
mation that has become available to American lawmakers about just how badly many of 
Washington’s client states are abusing their own citizens.’”). 
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nomic assistance on other countries’ human rights performances.47  The 
emphasis on political and civil rights, as opposed to economic rights, both 
kept with domestic commitments and allowed criticism of cold war adver-
saries.48 
Recently, a fifth camp, “Domestic Human Rights Integrators,” who em-
phasize the need for human rights at home as well as abroad, have become 
a meaningful part of the political landscape.  Supporters of this view can 
lay claim to some small federal-level victories.  For instance, the federal 
government has undertaken some review of its own practices in the past 
twenty years, demonstrating an increased commitment to its obligations 
under human rights treaties.  This includes the 1994 State Department ef-
forts to draft the Shattuck report to satisfy the ICCPR,49 and the submission 
of its first report to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimina-
tion in 2001.50  Similarly, in 2002, the United States began to allow outside 
observers to report on its domestic human rights practices to the U.N. Hu-
man Rights Council.51  This openness has also included a 2007 visit from 
the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights.52  Yet, outside of treaty com-
pliance reports, the federal and state governments have done little to direct-
ly demonstrate their support for the domestic internalization of internation-
al human rights treaties.53 
 
 47. Id. at 1241-42. 
 48. FALK, supra note 45, at 58. 
 49. CCPR, INITIAL REPORTS OF STATES PARTIES DUE IN 1993: UNITED STATES OF AMERI-
CA, Addendum (Aug. 24, 1994), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 
133836.pdf.  Both NGOs and the U.N. Commission on Human Rights used this report to 
strongly criticize domestic policies such as the mistreatment of immigrants. DRINAN, supra 
note 41, at 28-30; Daniel Wessner, From Judge to Participant: The United States as Cham-
pion of Human Rights, in DEBATING HUMAN RIGHTS: CRITICAL ESSAYS FROM THE UNITED 
STATES AND ASIA 255, 269 (Peter Van Ness ed., 1999). 
 50. U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 59th Sess., 1475th mtg., 
U.N. Doc. CERD/C/SR.1475 (2001). 
 51. These external observations include a report on migrants’ human rights. Gabriela 
Rodríguez Pizarro, Human Rights of Migrants: Mission to the Border between Mexico and 
the United States of America, (Oct. 31, 2002), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/2848af408d01ec0ac1256b09004e770b/5b6e3
e148f22c3fbc1256c8e00335f80/$FILE/g0215399.doc.  For a more recent report, see, e.g., 
Arjun Sengupta, Extreme Poverty and Human Rights—A Mission Report on the United 
States 30-31 (Jan. 6, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=961230 (follow “One-Click Download” hyperlink)). 
 52. Press Release, United Nations, Special Rapporteur on Human Rights of Migrants 
Ends Visit to the United States (May 17, 2007), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/ 
huricane.nsf/0/BA409950651325ECC12572E2002845A5?opendocument. 
 53. LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST 2001: HUMAN 
RIGHTS POLICIES FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION 106 (2001). 
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Domestic Human Rights Integrators are just beginning to coalesce ef-
forts to bring human rights home.  These efforts include the U.S. Human 
Rights Network, founded in 2002,54 which seeks to increase the capacity 
and visibility of the U.S. human rights movement as well as strengthen 
links between and among domestic and international human rights issues 
and groups.55  Most notably, the Human Rights Network’s activities in-
cludes a Katrina initiative “dedicated to ensuring that all levels of the U.S. 
government comply with its domestic and international legal obligations 
and norms concerning the rights and protections accorded to persons dis-
placed by natural disaster.”56  On other fronts, schools including the Uni-
versity of Chicago and Columbia University have expanded their joint ac-
tion and academic programs to include an exploration of domestic human 
rights at home.57  Similarly, with the ushering in of a new administration, 
the American Constitution Society crafted a policy blueprint for human 
rights.  This proposal promotes federal-level changes such as an executive 
order to “reconstitute and revitalize an Interagency Working Group on 
Human Rights which will serve as a coordinating body among federal 
agencies and departments for the promotion and respect of human rights 
and the implementation of human rights obligations in U.S. domestic poli-
cy,” act on specific treaty obligations, create a national human rights com-
mission, ratify outstanding human rights treaties, and undertake reviews of 
harmful reservations, understandings, and declarations in already-ratified 
human rights treaties.58  Legal scholars are increasingly focusing on this 
issue with several symposia devoted to the idea of bringing international 
law home.59 
 
 54. US Human Rights Network, About Us–History, http://www.ushrnetwork.org/about-
us-history (last visited Feb. 22, 2010). 
 55. US Human Rights Network, Core Principles & Goals, 
http://www.ushrnetwork.org/about-us-core-principles-goals (last visited Feb. 22, 2010).  It 
also conducts training sessions and is launching a human rights mapping and database 
project to gain a comprehensive picture of the work of its members. US Human Rights Net-
work, USHRN Launching Human Rights Mapping and Documentation Project, 
http://www.ushrnetwork.org/mapping_db (last visited Feb. 22, 2010). 
 56. US Human Rights Network, Hold the US Accountable: The US Human Rights Net-
work’s Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Human Rights Campaign, 
http://www.ushrnetwork.org/projects-katrina (last visited Feb. 22, 2010). 
 57. See Center for the Study of Human Rights, http://www.hrcolumbia.org/ (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2010); The University of Chicago Human Rights Program, Projects, 
http://humanrights.uchicago.edu/projects.shtml (last visited Feb. 22, 2010). 
 58. CATHERINE POWELL, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR LAW & POLICY, HUMAN RIGHTS 
AT HOME: A DOMESTIC POLICY BLUEPRINT FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION 3-5 (2008). 
 59. In addition to this volume, see also Human Rights in the United States: A Special 
Issue Celebrating the 10th Anniversary of the Human Rights Institute at Columbia Law 
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Yet the Domestic Human Rights Integrators have not focused exclusive-
ly on forcing federal ratification or passing national legislation.  CEDAW 
and other human rights treaties are not high priority agenda items for the 
President or the Legislature.  Rather, many of those concerned with human 
rights choose to focus on local action instead.  This next subsection seeks 
to explain why this is an important choice. 
B. Linking the Political to the Structural and Procedural 
These competing political approaches alone are insufficient to explain 
the significant difficulty entailed in federal human rights action.  Treaties 
also face a host of structural barriers that hamper ratification.60  Though 
popular and bipartisan treaties often easily surmount these obstacles, they 
can make the passage of treaties that raise the ire of the political factions 
mentioned above quite difficult.  First, the President has a de facto absolute 
veto over treaties.  Unless he decides to sign a treaty, it cannot move for-
ward, even if the Senate strongly supports it.61  Unlike the legislative veto, 
which Congress can override by a two-thirds vote in both branches, the 
President’s implicit treaty veto is final.  Exercising this de facto veto is also 
less costly because the refusal to sign is in many instances a political non-
event requiring substantially less political capital than the active decision to 
veto legislation that has already passed through Congress.62 
Second, while the refusal to sign can block a treaty, the President cannot 
create any commitment to ratify through signing.63  At best, mere signature 
creates an obligation “to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and 
purpose of the treaty”;64 at worst, it only asks a state to avoid undertaking 
an action which would hamper full compliance once the treaty has entered 
into domestic force.65  So the various presidents who have signed several 
core human rights treaties such as the International Covenant on Economic, 
 
School, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. (2008); Catherine Powell, International Law and the 
Constitution: Terms of Engagement, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 399 (2008). 
 60. A possible end run is to reconstrue treaties as executive agreements, but I do not ad-
dress this possibility as the major human rights documents have already been presented as 
treaties rather than executive agreements. 
 61. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 62. This observation may not always hold true, particularly in the case of the pocket ve-
to. 
 63. Harvard Research in International Law, Law of Treaties, 29 AM. J. INT’L L. 653, 769 
(noting that a signature creates no state obligation to ratify a treaty). 
 64. Curtis A. Bradley, Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S. Constitution, 
48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 307, 307 (2007).  This obligation is reflected in Article 18 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which the U.S. has not rejected and which might be 
viewed as customary international law. Id. at 307-08. 
 65. ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 94 (2000). 
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Social and Cultural Rights (1977), the American Convention on Human 
Rights (1977), CEDAW (1980), and the CRC (1995), have watched them 
languish for decades.66 
Moreover, the newly emerging presidential power to unsign a treaty67 
creates another related, if mostly theoretical,68 barrier to treaty ratification.  
Though this power has only been exercised once,69 some have urged the 
unsigning of human rights treaties such as the CRC and the International 
Labour Organization Convention on Race Discrimination in Employ-
ment.70  If presidents decide to use this power more frequently, it means 
one president cannot preserve a future president’s political capital or by-
pass a future president’s de facto veto.  In other words, the questionable ex-
ercise of one president’s power to unsign a treaty might force a future pres-
ident to resign the treaty if he wants it to move through the Senate.  This 
means that a sitting president that faces a hostile senate cannot guarantee 
his signing leaves a treaty in the Senate’s hands in case political fortunes 
realign with a hostile president and friendly senate.  Nor can a president 
even lock in a commitment to act consistently with the purposes of the trea-
ty, as unsigning is a complete exit that frees all domestic actors from any 
possible treaty-based restraints.71 
Finally, the constitutional decision to vest treaty passage in the Senate 
also weighs against the passage of progressive human rights treaties.  Un-
like the House of Representatives, the Senate is designed to be “less res-
ponsive to emerging political trends” through six-year terms and a cycling 
of elections that places only one-third of the seats up in each election.72  
 
 66. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 
(signed by the U.S. on Feb. 16, 1995); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (signed 
by the U.S. on July 17, 1980); American Convention on Human Rights, adopted Nov. 22, 
1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (signed by the U.S. on Jan. 6, 1977); International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 
(signed by the U.S. on Oct. 5, 1977). 
 67. See Curtis Bradley, U.S. Announces Intent Not to Ratify International Criminal 
Court Treaty, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L., May 2002, http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh87.htm. 
 68. Only time will tell if future presidents will choose to exercise this power. 
 69. See Letter from John R. Bolton, Under Sec’y of State for Arms Control and Int’l 
Sec., to Kofi Annan, UN Sec’y Gen., (May 6, 2002), available at 
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/05/06/court.letter.text/index.html (announcing the Presi-
dent’s decision to unsign the Rome Statute which creates the International Criminal Court’s 
jurisdiction). 
 70. See Edward T. Swaine, Unsigning, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2061, 2064 (2003). 
 71. Id. at 2082-83. 
 72. Tara Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 123 HARV. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2010); see GERALD LEONARD, THE INVENTION OF PARTY POLITICS: FEDERAL-
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This status quo bias does not block all, or even nearly all, treaties, but it 
makes those treaties that step ahead of social or political consensus difficult 
to pass.  Other Senate-specific structural barriers include Rule 22, which 
permits a single member to filibuster a treaty unless sixty percent of the 
Senate supports a cloture vote.73  In addition to the general filibuster prob-
lem, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee possesses absolute control 
over whether and when a treaty comes to the floor for debate.  Even if the 
Chair supports the treaty, other members can prevent a treaty from reaching 
the floor because the Committee cannot meet without a quorum.74 
I conclude this section by noting that while treaties are the most aggres-
sive mechanism for human rights to pass into the federal domestic arena, 
other national mechanisms exist.75  These include the legislative creation of 
national human rights institutions or passage of other human-rights-
oriented legislation.  Other legislative activity faces similar political hur-
dles, though not necessarily identical structural hurdles.  I focus here 
though on treaties because Congress has never passed the equivalent of 
domestic-implementing legislation for treaties that have failed to make it 
through the political process.  Though the Legislature might pass some-
thing that is substantively similar to the treaties’ domestic requirements, 
such human rights legislation has not been offered as an alternative or a 
supplement.76  In the section below, I offer some reasons why cities might 
be better situated to take such action. 
II.  THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF CITIES 
When the federal government is a reluctant first mover, many have sug-
gested moving to the sub-federal as a second-best option.  This section ex-
 
ISM, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN JACKSONIAN ILLINOIS 
27 (2002). 
 73. United States Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Rules of the Senate, 
Rule XXII Precedence of Motions, http://rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=RuleXXII 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2010). 
 74. See Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, The Institutional Foundations of 
Committee Power, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 85 (1987). 
 75. Executive efforts, such as President Clinton’s efforts to conduct human rights re-
views, also present another national strategy.  These reviews, however, were parasitic on the 
underlying human rights treaties.  I have discussed elsewhere why the president may be 
constitutionally limited in efforts to use purely executive efforts to make an end run around 
a Senate unwilling to ratify a treaty. See Wexler, supra note 2, at 17 (discussing such me-
chanisms in the context of the Kyoto Protocol). 
 76. Even the Obama administration has not framed key agenda items as human rights 
issues, regardless of their consistency with human rights treaties.  For instance, the adminis-
tration has never suggested that health care is a human right as contained by the Internation-
al Convention on Economic, Cultural, and Social Rights. 
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plores the reasons why some types of cities may be well positioned for the 
domestic integration of human rights norms.  Integration is often more po-
litically feasible at the local level than that at the federal or even state level.  
Reasons for this include, but are not limited to, political homogeneity, the 
avoidance of federalism and foreign policy concerns, and a more favorable 
structural environment that can facilitate passage of progressive proposals.  
Not all cities, however, are equally likely to adopt human rights ordinances 
and, thus, I try to explain what types of cities are most likely to act given 
the political feasibility features mentioned above. 
This enthusiasm for local action, however, must be tempered with a se-
rious discussion of the structural constraints on local behavior.  This sec-
tion addresses both the federal and state governments’ authority and pro-
pensity to limit the behavior of cities.  It also tempers the enthusiasm of my 
earlier work in this area by highlighting the limitations on state, federal, 
and international spillover.  Just as not all cities are likely to adopt human 
rights ordinances, even if cities have successful, flourishing human rights 
infrastructures, states and the federal government may be unlikely to follow 
suit.  
 
* * * 
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A. Typology 
A brief typology of human rights ordinances may prove to be helpful as 
human rights legislation and ordinances come in all shapes and sizes.  I be-
gin with what might be labeled as purely expressive human rights ordin-
ances.77  Such ordinances express the city’s solidarity with some piece of 
international law.  In so doing, they might also criticize the state or federal 
government’s non-compliance with such international law.  For instance, 
Berkeley’s 2002 Resolution to Oppose the Patriot Act, Justice Department 
Directives, and Executive Orders that Prevent the Protection of Civil 
Rights and Liberties affirms U.N. Charter Article 55 but does not commit 
the city to any new course of action.78  The resolution merely reiterates the 
city’s support for existing constitutional policies and disavows federal ac-
tivity.79  Similarly, in February 2009, Berkeley passed an ordinance dis-
avowing the U.S. practice of giving juveniles sentences of life without pa-
role.80  Berkeley based its opposition on, among other things, international 
human rights law.81  Yet Berkeley neither has nor pretends to have any 
control over federal or state criminal sentencing practices.82 
Second, cities might pass ordinances that are more than purely expres-
sive, but do not themselves create any enforceable rights.  Ordinances pro-
hibiting state officials from voluntarily complying with federal immigration 
enforcement laws might serve as an example.83  Individual immigrants 
would not have a private right of action for violations, but it may enable the 
 
 77. These might also be deemed “political graffiti” in the words of Richard Briffault. 
Richard Briffault, Remarks at the Fordham Urban Law Journal Cooper-Walsh Colloquium 
on Empowered Cities: The Emergence of Cities as Autonomous Actors (Oct. 30, 2009). 
 78. Berkeley, Cal., Resolution to Oppose the Patriot Act, Justice Department Directives 
and Executive Orders that Prevent the Protection of Civil Rights and Liberties (July 23, 
2002), available at http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/citycouncil/2002citycouncil/packet/ 
072302/2002-07-23%20Item%2031.pdf; see also Santa Cruz, Cal., Resolution 26.032, Res-
olution to Oppose the Patriot Act, Justice Department Directives and Executive Orders that 
Prevent the Protection of Civil Rights and Liberties (Nov. 12, 2002). 
 79. Berkeley, Cal., Resolution, supra note 78. 
 80. See Letter from Jesse Arreguin, Councilmember, Berkeley, Cal., to Jennifer Gran-
holm, Governor, Mich., (Feb. 10, 2009) available at http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/uploaded 
Files/Clerk/Level_3_-_City_Council/2009/02Feb/2009-02-10%20Item%2011%20Letter% 
20Supporting%20the%20Release%20of%20Efren%20Paredes,%20Jr.pdf. 
 81. Id. 
 82. In another example, Chapel Hill’s endorsement of the UDHR explicitly states that 
the city is not joining or creating a treaty, but merely providing a declaration of principles. A 
Resolution Adopting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as Guiding Principles 
(2009), available at http://townhall.townofchapelhill.org/agendas/2009/11/23/5p/5p-2009-
11-23_r11.pdf. 
 83. See, e.g., Rose Cuison Villazor, “Sanctuary Cities” and Local Citizenship, 37 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 573 (2010) (examining San Francisco sanctuary law). 
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future acquisition of positive rights such as those that flow from citizen-
ship.84  Another example might be human rights impact statement reviews 
that create procedural but not substantive obligations. 
Relatedly, cities might participate in treaty mechanisms either formally 
or informally.  For instance, Berkeley’s City Council recently voted to “re-
port to the U.N. on the city’s compliance with treaties on civil liberties, ra-
cial discrimination and torture.”85  While the city is not formally a member 
of these treaties, as a subcomponent of the United States, it is expressing its 
support for federal membership and any duties that might implicate city 
behavior as well as generating information to judge federal compliance.  
Yet, an individual would have no entitlement nor redress under these local 
procedures. 
Third, cities might pass ordinances which use international human rights 
concepts and treaties to reform city behavior.  The most frequently cited 
example, and one which I have discussed at length elsewhere, is San Fran-
cisco’s local CEDAW ordinance, which implements the treaty’s principles 
without actually participating in treaty organizations or governance.86  So 
far, San Francisco has completed CEDAW-mandated gender analyses of 
six city departments.  The gender analysis included a “framework to eva-
luate and address any differential impact of service delivery, employment 
practices, and budget allocation.”87  As a result of these analyses, the fol-
lowing changes were made: better allocation of resources to female offend-
ers in juvenile probation; increased and improved collection of gender dis-
aggregated data; changed placements of streetlights and sidewalk cuts; 
expansion of sexual harassment training; enhanced flexibility in meeting 
vendor requirements for women; and greater appointments of women to 
 
 84. See, e.g., Jesse McKinley, San Francisco Alters When Police Must Report Immi-
grants, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2009, at A19 (describing a bill passed by the San Francisco 
board of supervisors preventing deportation of juveniles arrested on felony charges until 
conviction). 
 85. Posting of Heather Ross to Daily Californian, 
http://blog.dailycal.org/news/tag/berkeley-city-council (Sept. 30, 2009, 11:38 PST). 
 86. Stacy Laira Lozner, Diffusion of Local Regulatory Innovations: The San Francisco 
CEDAW Ordinance and the New York City Human Rights Initiative, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 
768, 768, 776-84 (2004).  It was later amended to reflect the principles of the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Discrimination (a treaty that the U.S. ratified but 
has not implemented). 
 87. Emily M. Murase, Ph.D., Executive Director, San Francisco Dep’t on the Status of 
Women, Testimony at N.Y. City Council’s Governmental Operations Comm. Human Rights 
GOAL Hearing (Apr. 8, 2005), available at http://www.nychri.org/documents/Murase.pdf. 
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revenue-creating commissions.88  Influenced by San Francisco, other cities 
and states are promoting similar initiatives.89 
These human-rights-influenced actions might include the creation of 
human rights commissions or human rights ombudsmen.  For instance, the 
city of Eugene, Oregon has taken a model from abroad, discussed in more 
detail below, and designated itself a “human rights city.”90  So far, its hu-
man rights code includes a ban on a variety of discriminatory behaviors 
that far surpasses federal protections in housing, employment, and city con-
tracting.91  Eugene’s efforts include proactive efforts to prevent, rather than 
to merely remedy, discrimination, including unintentional or passive dis-
crimination. 
Fourth, cities can create positive rights through ordinances.  As a prac-
tical matter, it is important to note that cities actually are increasingly 
adopting local measures “that regulate individual rights, social welfare, and 
other measures traditionally thought as within the purview of the states.”92  
For instance, Bloomington, Indiana might recognize the right to a living 
wage by mandating covered employers pay above the federal minimum 
wage to covered workers.93  Similarly, Eugene’s human rights city program 
also hopes to speak to the full range of human rights, including political, 
cultural, social, and economic rights.  Eugene aspires to make human rights 
“a central part of every City program” by “striv[ing] to systematically in-
clude human rights values in proposing or considering new legislation; in 
 
 88. Krishanti Dharmaraj, WILD For Human Rights, Testimony at N.Y. City Council’s 
Governmental Operations Comm. Human Rights GOAL Hearing (Apr. 8, 2005), available 
at http://www.nychri.org/documents/Dharmara.pdf. 
 89. Both Los Angeles and Chicago have passed similar CEDAW ordinances.  Efforts 
are also underway in Seattle, Palo Alto, Santa Cruz County, and Santa Clara. See Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Adopted by the 
U.N. General Assembly on December 18, 1979, and Signed on Behalf of the United States 
of America on July 17, 1980: Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 107th Cong. 
105 (2002) (statement submitted by the National Education Association), available at 
http://ftp.resource.org/gpo.gov/hearings/107s/80461.pdf. 
 90. See Eugene, Oregon, The Human Rights City Project, www.humanrightscity.com 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2010). 
 91. See City of Eugene Human Rights Commission, http://www.eugene-or.gov/portal/ 
server.pt?open=335&qid=50709979&rank=1&parentname=SearchResult&parentid=5& 
mode=2&in_hi_userid=2&cahed=true (last visited Mar. 25, 2010) (including family status, 
marital status, and sexual orientation). 
 92. Richard C. Schragger, Can Strong Mayors Empower Weak Cities?  On the Power of 
Local Executives in a Federal System, 115 YALE L.J. 2542, 2574 (2006). 
 93. City of Bloomington, Living Wage Ordinance, http://bloomington.in.gov/sections/ 
viewSection.php?section_id=79 (last visited Feb. 22, 2010).  The city passed it through its 
human rights commission, and advocates that support it use human-rights-based arguments. 
See Milton Fisk: Human Rights and Living Wages, http://www.miltonfisk.org/writings/ 
human-rights-and-living-wages/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2010). 
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the design, implementation, and evaluation of policies and programs; in the 
course of making budgetary decisions; and in developing and diversifying 
its human resources.”94  These human rights programs are likely the pri-
ciest programs and the most taxing on a city’s limited resources.  In the 
next sections, I will use this typology both to explain which kinds of cities 
are likely to pass such policies, and to assess the spillover constraints of lo-
cal human rights ordinances. 
B. Optimizing the Intersection of Political and Structural 
1. Maximizing Political Homogeneity 
One reason we should expect to see more treaty-influenced human rights 
behavior at the local level is because some, though certainly not all, cities 
contain politically homogenous populations.  While the state of California 
contains so many varied interests that commentators have suggested split-
ting the state into two (or even three) entities, relatively speaking, those 
who reside in San Francisco or Berkeley tend to share much more aligned 
interests and preferences.  Both small and large cities can possess enough 
political homogeneity to pass legislation that would encounter greater diffi-
culty at the state or federal level.  Though large cities often contain diverse 
populations, they tend to have more voter interest convergence than the 
state in which they are located or than the federal population as a whole.  
For instance, recent maps of electoral politics demonstrate that while states 
as a whole tend to look purple with their mixed political views, individual 
cities seem to be strongly blue or red.95  If substantive objections are what 
really blocks the ratification of human rights treaties, then the strong politi-
cal homogeneity of at least some cities should make the passage of such 
proposals more likely. 
Relatedly, for those cities whose ideological preferences align with the 
treaty preferences, they can use human rights proposals to successfully 
compete for and retain citizens.  Charles Tiebout has suggested that cities 
compete for residents on the basis of their provision of social services.96  
While citizens might desire the efficient delivery of services, they also pay 
 
 94. Human Rights City, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.humanrightscity.com/ 
Human_Rights_City_Project/FAQs.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2010). 
 95. Robert J. Vanderbei, Election 2004 Results, http://www.princeton.edu/~rvdb/JAVA/ 
election2004/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2010) (see 3-D maps). 
 96. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 
418-20 (1956). 
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attention to the specific bundle of services provided.97  Just as people might 
be concerned about school districts or the rate of local taxes, they might al-
so care about the way in which cities frame and describe such services.  
The local integration of human rights treaties can encompass the provision 
of new services that the government has not offered before, new mechan-
isms of accountability for local government, as well as a new language for 
understanding the role of the city in the life of its citizens.  Thus, cities that 
believe its constituents will prefer such policies have a strong reason to in-
novate or mimic them. 
Of course, Tiebout’s insight that individuals move to localities in order 
to satisfy their preferences for public policies is often overstated.  Agglo-
meration theory suggests instead that many individuals, along with the 
businesses they work in, move to localities, particularly large cities, in or-
der to capture the efficiency and information gains of having lots of neigh-
bors.98  Thus, while the package of city services may matter strongly to 
some individuals, others may care about them only after satisfying their 
preferences for efficiency and information gains.  In some instances, those 
city services and structures may matter very little.99  Yet for some cities, 
like New York and San Francisco, this combination of Tieboutian individ-
uals and agglomerative individuals may actually cut in favor of the passage 
and retention of aggressive human rights policies.  Those most likely to op-
pose expansive economic rights and other progressive policies often find 
they are unwilling or unable to successfully threaten exit because they gain 
more from their particular agglomeration of neighbors than they lose from 
local policy.100  For instance, a business that dislikes a human rights living 
wage ordinance but has location-specific investments may find itself unable 
or unwilling to move. 
On the other hand, if certain businesses are able, and do in fact, move 
from relatively friendly cities as these ordinances increase costs to cities 
abroad, violations may actually accelerate as the businesses will not be sub-
 
 97. See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1498-99 (1987) (book review of RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE 
FOUNDERS’ DESIGN (1987), noting that families may move to a community to access its 
school system). 
 98. See EDWARD L. GLAESER, CITIES, AGGLOMERATION AND SPATIAL EQUILIBRIUM 
(2008). 
 99. Another reason one might want support on the local level is that it provides an alter-
native to the burgeoning rhetoric of competition.  Many cities are downplaying their public 
features and instead emphasizing a business model of the city with individuals as clients and 
administrators as managers. Schragger, supra note 92, at 2552-53. 
 100. David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, U. ILL. L. REV. (forth-
coming) (manuscript at 6, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1471555 (follow “One-Click Dowload” hyperlink)). 
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ject to any meaningful constraints.  For instance, if Los Angeles were to 
enact child labor ordinances based on the CRC that created protections 
above and beyond existing federal and state protections, sweatshops might 
move out of Los Angeles to a city (or country) less protective than Los An-
geles pre-ordinance.101  Sweatshops do not need the particular knowledge 
or transportation or set of neighbors unique to Los Angeles; it is easy for 
them to locate anywhere, though transportation costs increase if they move 
out of the country.  Such relocation might be more than an equal swap be-
cause the capital accumulation due to the lax human rights environment 
may further discourage that city or country from ratifying human rights 
treaties or from adopting human-rights-friendly policies.102 
2. Avoiding Federalism and Foreign Policy Concerns 
Local implementation also avoids the ire of International Federalists and 
Flexible Foreign Policy Advocates.  Although I identify a variety of politi-
cal objections to the federal integration of human rights, the public as a 
whole seems to support the idea of human rights and much of their substan-
tive content.  Opinion survey data reveals that more than eighty percent of 
the domestic population believes that America should strive to uphold hu-
man rights at home for those that are being denied those rights.103  When 
asked more specific questions to gauge their commitments, large majorities 
support issues such as equality, fairness, and freedom from mistreatment 
(as well as their framing as human rights),104 though economic rights such 
as freedom from poverty and adequate healthcare receive less support.105  
Even so, two-thirds of Americans believe that the government should both 
protect and provide human rights even when it means expanding govern-
ment assistance.106  Yet the same data suggests that nearly half of Ameri-
cans believe that sovereignty concerns should preclude U.S. membership in 
human rights treaties, and more than half believe that divergent cultures 
and values prevent the possibility of universally applicable human rights.107 
 
 101. I am indebted to David Schleicher for this example. 
 102. See Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Climate Poli-
cies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1966-72 (2007) (suggesting such a problem in the case of 
state and local regulation of environmental problems). 
 103. THE OPPORTUNITY AGENDA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE U.S.: OPINION RESEARCH WITH 
ADVOCATES, JOURNALISTS, AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC 3 (2007). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 4. 
 106. Id. at 5. 
 107. Id. at 6.  This includes a high percentage of African Americans and Hispanics, often 
the most likely to benefit from human rights at home. Id. at 10.  In fact, those most suppor-
WEXLER CHRISTENSEN 4/29/2010  7:07 PM 
624 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVII 
Thus, if international federalism is driving the federal debate over hu-
man rights, city level passage should be unproblematic, since it neither 
binds the country to participating in international governance, nor allows 
the federal government to aggrandize its powers vis-à-vis sub-federal units.  
In addition, local integration does not force constituents to address thorny 
issues such as how the language and substance of human rights should ap-
ply abroad.  Arguments about cultural relativism have substantially less sa-
lience when one is only talking about a domestic population.  For instance, 
if Eugene, Oregon becomes a human rights city with a particularized notion 
of what constitutes gender discrimination and includes gender stereotyping, 
it need not deeply grapple over whether that interpretation is consistent 
with how other countries view gender discrimination or whether it properly 
respects other cultures.108 
Relatedly, city integration avoids the dilemma of Flexible Foreign Policy 
Advocates as cities lack the foreign policy concerns of federal actors.  
While cities may seek international business or global social relationships, 
the constitution, as discussed below, generally bars them from explicitly 
conducting foreign affairs.109  Many scholars have noted this as a con-
straint, such as in the Burma procurement policies, but in other ways, it is 
also liberating.  Domestic integration sends no direct message about the di-
rection of the country, though it may send a signal about the possibility of 
change.  Cities need not worry as much about what message or example 
they set for other actors, nor need they worry that it will rupture preexisting 
relationships or irritate certain sets of international political actors.  For in-
stance, if San Francisco affirms the U.N. Human Rights Charter, a country 
will be hard-pressed to use that to criticize the United States for taking or 
not taking a particular position on a complicated international issue, such as 
the relationship between the Israeli government and Palestinians.  Similar-
ly, in interpreting treaty language or treaty concepts, cities need not con-
cern themselves with whether their potentially idiosyncratic interpretations 
will be debated at treaty meetings, derided by foreign countries, or used to 
criticize third-party nation-states who do not agree with the city’s interpre-
tation. 
 
tive of a domestic human rights agenda include the vast majority of African Americans and 
those with incomes below $25,000. Id. at 21. 
 108. Of course, a city may face particularized local instances when those questions are 
raised, but I assume those are less pervasive than having to address the law’s application in 
a foreign cultural context.  In other words, determining whether a gender stereotyping law 
ought to apply to an individual Muslim’s hiring practices in a U.S. city is much less difficult 
than the federal government determining whether a Muslim country must have the same 
gender stereotyping laws under an antidiscrimination treaty as the United States. 
 109. See infra Part II.C.1.a. 
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3. Enhancing Warm Glow and Direct Gains 
Insights from psychology also suggest that cities might be more likely, 
and perhaps even better, first movers in this context.  Many of those who 
support human rights initiatives do so because they are purely oriented to 
others, or because of the warm glow they receive in helping others.  I argue 
that, to the extent that support for human rights is motivated by altruism, it 
is more likely to succeed at the local level than at the national level.  This is 
because I believe warm glow is likely to be enhanced in the local environ-
ment and dampened in the federal and international setting.  In another con-
text,110 I have described the importance of human rights treaties and their 
related discourse in overcoming a particular fundamental attribution error 
that bad things must happen to bad people who deserve them.  I noted that 
as a result of the fundamental attribution error and the belief in a just world, 
when one sees something bad happen to individuals or groups, one often 
engages in victim blame and derogation.111  This tendency is magnified 
when victims are perceived of as meaningfully different from the relevant 
community or if their suffering is likely to be difficult to remedy.112  Con-
versely, the tendency toward victim-blaming is weakened when the people 
suffering are seen as similar to the witness,113 as empathy triggered by si-
milarities can muffle or trump the instincts aroused by the belief in a just 
world.114 
I suggest in this paper that moving human rights to the local level can 
emphasize the close relationship between those providing and those receiv-
ing assistance as well as allowing people to see the direct benefits of the 
city’s provision of social services.  This seems likely to be particularly im-
portant for positive rights and positive rights-enabling ordinances—it may 
be the case that people are more likely to support such rights when they are 
closer to the recipients.  When altruism exists, evidence suggests that 
people are most willing to self-sacrifice or redistribute with those with 
whom they share physical or cultural proximity.  They often privilege their 
 
 110.  See Wexler, supra note 3, at 395-96. 
 111. Carolyn L. Hafer & Laurent Begue, Experimental Research on Just-World Theory: 
Problems, Developments, and Future Challenges, 131 PSYCHOL. BULL. 128, 128 (2005). 
 112. Claudia Dalbert, Belief in a Just World, Well Being, and Coping with an Unjust 
Fate, in RESPONSES TO VICTIMIZATIONS AND BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD 87, 100-01 (Leo Mon-
tada & Melvin J. Lerner eds., 1998); Melvin J. Lerner & Leo Montada, An Overview: Ad-
vances in Belief in a Just World Theory and Methods, in RESPONSES TO VICTIMIZATIONS AND 
BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD, supra, at 2. 
 113. SHARON LAMB, THE TROUBLE WITH BLAME: VICTIMS, PERPETRATORS, AND RESPON-
SIBILITY 92 (1996); Lerner & Montada, supra note 112, at 4. 
 114. Leo Montada, Belief in a Just World: A Hybrid of Justice Motive and Self-Interest, 
in RESPONSES TO VICTIMIZATIONS AND BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD, supra note 112, at 217, 243. 
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relationships with those nearby at the expense of those farther away.115  Re-
latedly, “most citizens are much more likely to sacrifice for a compatriot 
than a noncompatriot, especially when giving to noncompatriots comes at 
the expense of needy compatriots.”116  This conclusion is consistent with 
survey data which indicates “[a]n exceptional majority [of Americans 
polled] favor[] fixing pressing problems at home rather than addressing 
challenges to the United States from abroad” and a widespread American 
preference for funding domestic programs over foreign aid.117 
Not all cities will engage in such behavior and not all people will feel the 
warm glow of giving, even if it is moved to the local level.  As described 
above, some, like the Positive Rights Rejecters, fundamentally believe the 
provision of social services and positive rights is an inappropriate role for 
the government or one it cannot engage in successfully.  My point is a more 
limited one: moving efforts down to the local level can dampen the belief 
that positive rights ought not be provided because the recipients are unwor-
thy, outsiders, or that their problems are unsolvable. 
Second, for those less concerned with the warm glow of altruistically 
passing human rights ordinances, local internationalism provides a defina-
ble set of benefits to citizens.  While treaty signature and ratification is of-
ten touted as outward-looking and a mechanism to export our values 
abroad, domestic human rights integration is all about benefitting the local 
citizenry.  Even if one does not anticipate needing the provision of social 
services, enhancing transparency and anti-discrimination of local govern-
ment officials is ostensibly something that benefits all local citizens, and 
 
 115. See Michael J. Green, Institutional Responsibility for Global Problems, 30 PHIL. 
TOPICS 79, 79-85 (2002) (discussing the “restrictive conceptions” of responsibility). 
 116. Jack Goldsmith, Liberal Democracy and Cosmopolitan Duty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
1667, 1677 (2003).  Of course, supporting government programs which redistribute is not 
exactly the same as giving yourself, but for our purposes, they are close enough.  Acting at 
the city level allows altruistically-minded individuals to channel their efforts through local 
government institutions which are much more likely to make a difference than individual 
action alone.  Government action solves the dilemma of collective action problems or the 
belief that someone else will step in and help. 
 117. CHI. COUNCIL ON GLOBAL AFFAIRS, ANXIOUS AMERICANS SEEK NEW DIRECTION IN 
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY: RESULTS OF A 2008 SURVEY OF PUBLIC OPINION 6 (2008), 
available at http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/POS_Topline%20Reports/ 
POS%202008/2008%20Public%20Opinion%202008_US%20Survey%20Results.pdf.  Fur-
thermore, “[t]he U.S. public does not view helping to bring a democratic form of govern-
ment to other nations as a high priority.  This foreign policy goal is considered ‘very impor-
tant’ by only 17 percent of Americans, placing it at the bottom of the list of fifteen goals.” 
Id. at 15. 
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they are more likely to see and experience the benefit than a similar refor-
mation at the state or federal level.118 
4. Utilizing Structural Advantages 
Finally, many cities are structurally better suited to pass the human 
rights proposals discussed below than the federal government is to ratify 
human rights treaties.  The proposals and ordinances I discuss below could 
come from either mayors or city councils.  While developing political con-
sensus in favor of a new proposal is often difficult, particularly when such 
a proposal commits the city to spending resources or reforming its own bu-
reaucracy, no city councils of which I am aware contain the sort of filibus-
ter mechanisms embedded in the Senate.  Of course, those cities run by ei-
ther strong mayors opposed to proposals or coalitions of elites that oppose 
the substance of treaties will be unlikely to push such changes through.  
That being said, many of the stable coalitions that can arise in a city may be 
responsive to the public interest in favor of the treaties.119 
It should be unsurprising that many cities possess a structure that allows 
the passage of ordinances more easily than the federal government can rati-
fy treaties or pass human rights legislation.  In many instances, the U.S. 
Senate is sui generis because the framers crafted it as an anti-democratic 
check on the House of Representatives.120  No such concerns dominated the 
creation of city governance structures.  Also, given the limited reach of city 
governments on the front end and states’ broad ability to preempt city be-
havior on the back end, states might have been less concerned about em-
bedding chokepoints for city action in the city structure itself.  Moreover, 
constituent preferences tend to play a larger role in the behavior of local 
governments than in state or federal governments because individual citi-
zens believe that their voices matter more in the local setting121 and they 
have greater capacity to prevent capture by special interest groups.122  Thus 
 
 118. Goldsmith, supra note 116, at 1677 (explaining why people are more altruistic to 
those that are closer). 
 119. Schragger, supra note 92, at 2551. 
 120. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The One Senator, One Vote Clause, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 
159 (1995).  Most state senates look much more like their sister house of representatives 
than the federal senate. 
 121. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. 
L. REV. 346, 397 (1990). 
 122. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Suburbs as Exit, Suburbs as Entrance, 106 MICH. L. REV. 
277, 297 (2007) (noting that constituents of small local governments can ensure responsive-
ness by monitoring local officials and exercising exit); Matthew Parlow, A Localist’s Case 
for Decentralizing Immigration Policy, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 1061, 1070-71 (2007) (identi-
fying the opportunities for participation in the decision-making processes of small local 
government). 
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the political homogeneity described above gains additional weight in city 
as opposed to state or federal politics. 
In sum, given the combined effects of political homogeneity, the avoid-
ance of federalist and foreign policy objections, the enhanced warm glow 
and other individual benefits, and the structure of many city governments, 
we should expect to see a few major blue cities like San Francisco, New 
York, and Chicago along with smaller cities like Eugene, Berkeley, and 
Chapel Hill adopting such policies.  Other like-minded (and likely near-
by)123 cities that do not wish to be innovators may wait to see the outcome 
of the ordinances and then model themselves on the ones that succeed.  
That being said, I do not anticipate a quick, ensuing cascade to either more 
diverse or more politically moderate cities and suburbs.  Just as some ci-
ties’ political preferences will favor the substance of human rights ordin-
ances, others will not.  Successful innovation can convince sympathetic 
neighbors and over time may even influence the perception of human 
rights; but as described in the subsection below, city ordinances are not 
going to quickly turn red cities, states, and federal governments blue.124 
C. Limitations 
1. Structural 
a. Federal Constitution 
As I and others have dealt with these arguments elsewhere,125 I wish to 
only briefly revisit the constitutional limits on city action in integrating in-
ternational human rights law.  First, the Constitution provides several tex-
tual limitations including the federal government’s exclusive authority to 
conduct treaties with foreign powers,126 which clearly precludes cities from 
joining a multilateral treaty regime or participating in its governance.  
These limits probably matter more for environmental agreements, which 
involve collective action problems, while many human rights agreements 
 
 123. See Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy?  Policy Innovation in 
Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1350-51 (2009) (explaining why a juris-
diction can more easily adopt a policy of its neighbor than of a distant jurisdiction). 
 124. Human rights need not correlate with red/blue party politics, but in practice they of-
ten do.  Cities are all over the map with their approaches to immigration, ranging from hos-
tile anti-employment and anti-housing policies to sanctuary cities devoted to non-
cooperation laws that “make their boundaries safe-havens for undocumented immigrants.” 
Matthew J. Parlow, Progressive Policy-Making on the Local Level: Rethinking Traditional 
Notions of Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 371, 376-78 (2008). 
 125.  See, e.g., Wexler, supra note 2, at 41-47. 
 126. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10. 
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govern seemingly purely internal matters.  Even human rights treaties, 
however, include governance structures in which cities cannot participate.  
The Compact Clause also limits sub-federal actors’ ability to conduct 
agreements and compacts: courts have interpreted this clause as requiring 
congressional approval for arrangements that increase a state’s political 
power or encroach on the nation’s power.127  Thus, taking the clause to its 
logical conclusion, sub-federal actors like cities cannot bypass the U.S. 
Government if they seek to conclude binding commitments with other gov-
ernment actors.  For agreements with foreign countries or foreign cities, 
American cities must find some other way to signal their intent to be 
bound, such as the use of memoranda of understanding and other non-
binding pacts to signal their intentions. 
In addition to the textual constitutional limits on sub-federal action, the 
federal government retains the power to preempt sub-federal initiatives.128  
Thus, Congress may pass a statute to preempt a particular act of sub-federal 
integration or it may rely on courts to enforce its preferences.129  In recent 
years, the Supreme Court has used statutory preemption in cases like Cros-
by v. National Foreign Trade Council to strike down a Massachusetts law 
banning state procurement from companies doing business in Burma, be-
cause the state ban interfered with the more calibrated federal sanctions 
policy.130 
The Supreme Court has also found preemption on the basis of dormant 
federal powers.  In the 1968 case Zschernig v. Miller, the Supreme Court 
suggested that any state laws with “more than some incidental or indirect 
effect” on foreign affairs would be invalid, regardless of any showing of 
direct conflict with federal actions or even any affirmative federal activity 
in the subject area.131  The more recent case of American Insurance Asso-
 
 127. See, e.g., Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438–42 (1981); see also Andrew A. 
Bruce, The Compacts and Agreements of States with One Another and with Foreign Powers, 
2 MINN. L. REV. 500 (1918). 
 128. Courts have recognized the following varieties of preemption: (1) express preemp-
tion, in which a federal statute clearly expresses Congress’s desire to exclude state activity; 
(2) obstacle preemption, in which a state statute stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
of the purposes and objectives of a federal statute; (3) conflict preemption, in which a state 
statute makes it impossible to comply with federal law; and (4) field preemption, in which 
the federal government has acted so definitely in a field that there is “no room for the States 
to supplement it,” or the federal interest in controlling the subject is strong enough to pre-
sume federal law precludes state action. Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemp-
tion, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 205-06 (2000) (developing this useful taxonomy of preemp-
tion cases). 
 129. See generally Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the 
Dormant Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127 (2000). 
 130. 530 U.S. 363, 366, 378-79 (2000). 
 131. 389 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1968) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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ciation v. Garamendi132 may have revived Zschernig’s long ignored foreign 
affairs preemption doctrine by raising the possibility of independent execu-
tive branch preemption authority.133  Sub-federal integration deepens this 
uncertainty by raising the question of when treaty rejection or treaty avoid-
ance constitutes a policy sufficient to preempt sub-federal action. 
Ultimately, whatever constitutional limits exist, they constrain sub-
federal action only to the extent that sub-federal actors either face or at 
least fear facing federal enforcement.134  In many prior instances of sub-
federal activism, the federal government has been reluctant to intervene.  
Despite the broad language in Holmes v. Jennison,135 states have concluded 
numerous covenants with foreign entities, including environmental pacts, 
without seeking congressional approval.136  Neither Congress nor the courts 
have spoken on these covenants,137 nor have they acted to preempt a varie-
ty of questionable city behaviors such as those declaring non-binding nuc-
lear weapons-free zones;138 divesting stock from firms doing business in 
South Africa; restricting procurement of goods and services when the bid-
der for a city contract did business in South Africa;139 and passing an or-
 
 132. 539 U.S. 396 (2003). 
 133. The Court held that executive branch agreements with foreign countries to settle in-
surance claims arising out of World War II preempted a California law forcing disclosure of 
information on insurance companies operating during World War II.  While the executive 
branch agreements did not expressly preempt state laws or even address all the countries 
covered by the California law, the state policy of forcing broad disclosure was found to un-
dermine the executive policy of encouraging voluntary establishment of settlement funds 
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dinance repudiating torture committed by the Bush administration.  On the 
other hand, Congress did expressly preempt state anti-boycott laws, which 
prohibited state residents from conducting certain transactions with Arab 
states.140  Similarly, the Justice Department filed suit and defeated an Oakl-
and ordinance that banned firms from doing weapons manufacturing work 
and restricted the transportation of nuclear materials through the city’s ju-
risdiction.141  Both Crosby and Garamendi suggest that federal courts may 
be embracing a more expansive preemption policy, which may in turn en-
courage more challenges. 
b. State Limits 
In addition to federal preemption, states can also place significant limits 
on their behavior.142  To begin with, for much of their history, cities acted 
under the severe restraints of the Dillon Rule which only allowed localities 
to exercise those powers expressly granted by the state.143  For the last cen-
tury, the creation of home rule has allowed local governments to exercise 
all powers the state has not expressly reserved to itself.144  Almost all states 
have granted most of their cities home rule powers which permit them to 
set up local constitutions and to legislate in areas of local concern.  Even 
with home rule, however, states tended to significantly limit local policy 
making145 and many state courts viewed the scope of purely local concern 
to be quite narrow.146  This frustration led to a second round of reform, in 
which many states granted cities legislative home rule.147  This expanded 
authority changed the courts’ preemption analysis to a determination of 
whether the city ordinance conflicts with state law.148 
Of course states can, like the federal government, also preempt city be-
havior through new, direct legislation or judicial interpretation of existing 
powers and legislation.  States have shown limited, but real interest in 
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preempting some city ordinances consistent with human rights.  For in-
stance, some state courts have found city living wage ordinances to be im-
permissible intrusions on state power.149  Moreover, after state courts 
upheld local ordinances under the city’s authority, one state passed legisla-
tion explicitly preempting living wage laws.150  This sort of preemption 
seems most likely to occur when a very blue city acts in a very red state 
that does not share its ideology, and the policy has negative spillover ef-
fects on other cities in the state. 
Business and other interest groups may, and in fact are likely to, seek to 
use state courts and legislatures to preempt city ordinances.151  For in-
stance, Paul Diller credits successful city ordinances as prompting states to 
preempt the following ordinances: restaurant smoking bans, domestic part-
nership benefits for government employees, and rent control ordinances.152  
Sometimes the mere fear of city innovation will prompt proactive preemp-
tion in advance of city policies such as Louisiana’s state law forbidding ci-
ties to increase the minimum wage above state levels.153 
Businesses have two reasons to protest: they may fear that they will suf-
fer specific high local costs in conforming to the regulation, and they may 
desire uniformity in regulation because the costs of complying with a pat-
chwork of varying city regulations is higher than complying with a single 
policy.154  For instance, businesses have opposed smoking bans, gay rights 
legislation, and living wage laws under this rationale.155  One reason they 
 
 149. New Orleans Campaign for a Living Wage v. City of New Orleans, 825 So. 2d 
1098, 1101-02, 1108 (La. 2002). 
 150. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 104.001(2) (West 2010). 
 151. Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1113 (2007). 
 152. Id. at 1118-19.  At least four states—Arizona, Colorado, Massachusetts, and Ore-
gon—have legislation that expressly preempts local rent control ordinances. See ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 33-1329 (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-12-301 (West 2010); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40P, § 5 (West 2010); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91.225 (West 2010).  
State legislatures in other states—namely, New York and California—have passed legisla-
tion aimed at weakening local rent control laws. See California Begins Easing Its Once-
Strict Laws on Rent Control, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1995, at A21. 
 153. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:642 (2009); Diller, supra note 151, at 1139 & n.117. 
 154. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the Na-
tional Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 22-23 (2007); Louis Uchitelle, Minimum 
Wages, City by City; As More Local Laws Pass, More Businesses Complain, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 19, 1999, at C1. 
 155. Modern Cigarette, Inc. v. Town of Orange, 774 A.2d 969, 976 (Conn. 2001); Lex-
ington Fayette County Food & Beverage Ass’n v. Lexington Fayette Urban County Gov’t, 
131 S.W.3d 745, 748 (Ky. 2004); Allied Vending Inc. v. City of Bowie, 631 A.2d 77, 78 
(Md. 1993); Tri-Nel Mgmt., Inc. v. Bd. of Health, 741 N.E.2d 37, 40 (Mass. 2001); Take 
Five Vending, Ltd. v. Town of Provincetown, 615 N.E.2d 576, 578 (Mass. 1993); C.I.C. 
Corp. v. Twp. of E. Brunswick, 628 A.2d 753, 754 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993); Vatore 
WEXLER CHRISTENSEN 4/29/2010  7:07 PM 
2010] LOCAL HUMAN RIGHTS INTERNATIONALISM 633 
might succeed at the state level is because businesses hurt by the regulation 
will 
often protest vociferously and, in some instances, receive the support of 
groups that purport to represent the entire business community, such as 
chambers of commerce.  At the same time, perhaps out of a sense of “pro-
business” solidarity, or because the gains from the proposed local regula-
tion are too small and diffuse to those business [sic] that stand to benefit, 
support from the business community for many new local regulations is 
often muted or nonexistent.156 
When the political preferences of the city override business interests, 
businesses can get the state government to explicitly override these ordin-
ances.157  The same reasons that favor the ordinance’s proponents seeking 
city rather than state reform, favor the businesses at the state level.  Lobby-
ing state legislatures is more expensive, which often benefits business in-
terests,158 though it does mean that they may not seek to undertake action 
where the costs of the ordinance are low. 
Finally, in the absence of express preemption by the legislature, oppo-
nents of the ordinance may seek judicial preemption.  State court jurispru-
dence is similar to what is described above in federal preemption jurispru-
dence.  If there is no express preemption, federal and state courts will look 
for implied preemption which will either occur through conflict with state 
laws or state occupation of the field.  In undertaking conflict preemption, 
state courts often ask “whether a local ordinance substantially interferes 
with state law or the state’s constitutional responsibilities.”159  While 
preemption poses a real limitation—scholars present the courts’ jurispru-
dence in this area as a “problematic shadow”160—some room for local in-
novation still exists. 
2. Limited Spillover: State, Federal, and International 
On occasion, city innovation has spurred state spillovers.  Though hu-
man rights ordinances face a significant uphill battle, such experiments 
may hasten state or federal action in at least two instances.  If the federal 
government and the states resist human rights efforts because they are un-
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sure of the benefits of such programs, then spillover would be a strong pos-
sibility after successful city action.161  In such a world, cities bear the costs 
and risks of innovating and the states and federal government could simply 
free ride off of their efforts.  Second, and perhaps more importantly, if city 
efforts change constituents’ underlying objections to the promotion of posi-
tive rights, then spillover is also a possibility.  In the final work of this 
cycle, I intend to discuss the ways in which local efforts can serve as a me-
chanism to articulate and justify human rights principles.  Perhaps such jus-
tifications might be persuasive to those outside the jurisdiction in which the 
human rights are enacted.  If so, then spillover is possible, though I antic-
ipate this process to be a very long one with limited effects given the power 
of other constraints.  Though part of the point of this series of articles is to 
point out that the United States is in need of international law’s influence 
and that domestic law does not perfectly mirror the content of international 
human rights treaties, existing city-level efforts are, in general, unlikely to 
trigger widespread state, federal, or global change. 
Those other constraints can be distilled from many of the observations 
described above.  Though citizens may experience warm glow or more di-
rect personal benefits from human rights ordinances, such policies often 
raise significant costs as well.  While one reason posited for the emergence 
of city and state environmental mini-Kyoto policies is the possibility of 
economic gain, human rights treaties are unlikely to present similar short 
term economic gains.  Providing positive rights is likely to prove quite ex-
pensive.  Perhaps, highly motivated, politically homogenous groups are 
willing to bear those costs, but the discussion of preemption suggests most 
other participants in state-level politics are not.  Resistance may come from 
those most likely to pay for such proposals or from those unconvinced of 
human rights’ theoretical soundness.  So just as most large cities are blue 
with some willingness to support such efforts, many smaller cities are red 
and passing ordinances in the opposite direction for much the same rea-
sons—they are politically homogenous, feel their ideological preferences 
are underrepresented on the federal and state level, and receive a warm 
glow from public oriented legislation such as anti-immigration policies and 
restrictions on sex offenders. 
Further constraints hamper the domestic and the international level.  
While many are optimistic that building up domestic human rights will also 
translate into greater ability to promote human rights treaties, that relation-
ship does not necessarily follow.  To return to the arguments made at the 
beginning of the paper, city ordinances simply do not have to grapple with 
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some of the most important objections to human rights treaties.  Many 
Americans believe that they ought not “interpret and enforce human rights 
for people living in other countries”162 even as they support human rights at 
home.  Similarly, city experiments provide us no data about the legitimacy 
of the International Federalists and Flexible Foreign Policy Advocates ar-
guments.  If local experiments fail to address these objections, then oppo-
nents will continue to use senatorial chokepoints to block treaty ratification.  
In turn, that limits, though does not extinguish, the possibilities for interna-
tional human rights relationships to develop and grow. 
CONCLUSION 
As this Article posits, the world in which the federal government will 
not ratify human rights treaties, local human rights internationalism may 
provide a second best option.  Politically homogenous cities may be able to 
pass ordinances that express support for human rights treaties, enable the 
exercise of human rights, reform state behavior that violates human rights, 
and create the first step toward the utilization of positive rights.  These or-
dinances can matter a great deal to the individuals that benefit from them 
and the communities that embrace them.  Yet isolated ordinances alone 
seem unlikely to create the sort of justification for expansive human rights 
that will spillover to widespread state endorsement and federal ratification.  
Thus, the next article in this project will address the question of how to use 
the administrative state to create a better foundation for widespread domes-
tic human rights support. 
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